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 Prethodno priopćenje
Summary
Owing to its particular features, the market of luxury goods is a point of 
interest to lawyers as much as to other professions such as economists or 
sociologists. These features play an important role in legal regulation of the 
market. While the starting point is competition law, the assessment of anti-
competitive conduct under Article 101 of the TFEU cannot be complete without 
resorting to intellectual property law policies and rules. With the rise of the 
importance of internet sales, novel issues have been put before the competition 
authorities and reviewing courts, such as legality of various types of online 
restrictions in the selective distribution systems. Employing a combined IP law 
and competition law approach to these issues, this paper offers insights and 
comments on EU case law, with primary focus on the recent CJEU judgment 
in Coty. The intricacies of the interplay among different competition law rules 
and exemptions is particularly evidenced in this case. However, limited by its 
fact-pattern, the Coty judgment may serve as a clarification about the deluxe 
competition law treatment only of certain online sale prohibitions within the 
SDSs, while there will certainly be continuing discussions and national case law 
developments on other internet related competition law restrictions awaiting 
further elucidations by the CJEU.
Keywords: EU law; competition law; intellectual property; trademark; luxury 
products; internet; selective distribution; vertical agreements.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Luxury goods market is growing fast. According to Delloite, in the fiscal year 
2015 the top 100 luxury brand companies generated sales in the amount of US$212 
billion,1 while in 2017 Bain and Co. reporters estimate that the overall sales of luxury 
goods reached €1.2 trillion.2 In this apparently huge market, it is important to maintain 
and possibly improve one’s market position. These economic considerations needs 
to be adequately regulated, which is currently achieved through several branches of 
law. Luxury goods, recognisable to consumers by their brands, are legally protected 
mostly as trademarks. Trademark law and intellectual property (hereinafter: IP) 
law in general, confer exclusive rights to trademark holders, which means that the 
rightholder may prevent certain acts of third parties, such as producing, importing, 
and distributing of goods bearing the trademark in question. This exclusivity may 
be seen to stand in opposition to protecting free competition, one of the objectives 
of competition law. However, the flipside is true, as both IP law and competition law 
strive to promote consumer welfare and efficient allocation of resources. The history 
of relationship between these two branches of law has been very intense and dynamic. 
With the technological and economic developments, new issues are raised requiring a 
profound understanding of the underlying principles of both disciplines.
Most recently the CJEU has rendered its judgment in the Coty case on the 
topical issue of European Union competition law treatment of a selective distribution 
system (hereinafter: SDS) as employed by the luxury brand producers.3 This paper 
thus intends to offer a combined IP-law and competition-law analysis showing how 
the two disciplines can work hand in hand to produce both economically and legally 
sound results. In doing so, the following section deals with the main features and 
functions of trademarks, especially when they serve as a legal protector of a luxury 
brand. The subsequent section focuses on the rationale of the luxury brand producers 
when deciding to opt for the SDS, while the next one is concerned with the competition-
law framework for the SDSs in the EU. The remainder of the paper discusses in details 
the most recent CJEU case law on the topic, in particular the judgment in Coty, with 
the concluding remarks summarised in the end.
2. TRADEMARK FUNCTIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS
Trademarks, along with other IP rights, are recognised as one of the human rights 
by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,4 in its Article 17(2). It 
is also accepted as one of the justifiable restrictions to trade among MSs under the 
1 Deloitte Luxury Multicountry Survey for Global Powers of Luxury Goods 2017, https://www2.
deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/consumer-industrial-products/gx-cip-
global-powers-luxury-2017.pdf (last visited 2 August 2018).
2 Bain and Co. Luxury Goods Worldwide Market Study, Fall–Winter 2017, http://www.bain.de/
Images/BAIN_REPORT_Global_Luxury_Report_2017.pdf (last visited 2 August 2018), p. 1.
3 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty Germany GmbH v Parfümerie Akzente GmbH, 6 December 2017, 
EU:C:2017:941.
4 OJ C 326, 26 October 2012, pp. 391-407.
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Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter: TFEU)5 in its Article 
36. The early proclamation of the CJEU about the IP rights was in the context of the 
principle of non-discrimination, free movement of goods (in particular with regard to 
the doctrine of exhaustion) and competition.6 In several cases, the CJEU developed 
the concepts of “essential function” and “specific object” (“specific subject-matter”). 
“Essential function” of the trademark has been defined by the aim “to guarantee 
the identity of the origin of the trade-marked product to the consumer or ultimate 
user, by enabling him without any possibility of confusion to distinguish that product 
from products which have another origin”.7 This is traditionally the most important 
function of trademark and consists in clearly marking the source or origin of the goods 
(or services) in relation to which the trademark is being used.8 As may be concluded 
from the use of the adjective “essential”, the function of indicating the origin is not 
the only trademark function recognised in EU law.9 Besides function of origin which 
“the trademark is always supposed to fulfil”, recent CJEU case law has repeatedly 
emphasised the advertising and investment functions as well.10 While advertising 
function is activated when the rightholder is “using its mark for advertising purposes 
designed to inform and persuade consumers”,11 the investment function comes into 
5 Codified version, OJ C 202, 7 June 2016, pp. 47-197.
6 Toth, A. G., Intellectual Property Rights, in: Oxford Encyclopaedia of European Community 
Law, Volume II: The Law of the Internal Market, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 
504-506. 
7 CJEU, C-102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft 
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, 23 May 1978, EU:C:1978:108, para 7; C-119-75, Terrapin 
(Overseas) Ltd. v Terranova Industrie CA Kapferer & Co., 22 June 1976, EU:C:1976:94, p. 
1049 and 1054; CJEU, C-3/78, Centrafarm BV v American Home Products Corporation, 10 
October 1978, EU:C:1978:174, para. 12; CJEU, C-10/89, SA CNL-SUCAL NV v HAG GF AG, 
17 October 1990, EU:C:1990:359, para. 14
8 Tritton, G., et al., Intellectual Property in Europe, 2nd ed., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), 
p. 506. This is confirmed in the recital 10 of the First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 
December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, OJ L 
40, 11.2.1989, pp. 1–7, which is equivalent to recital 11 of the Directive 2008/95/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the 
Member States relating to trade marks (codified version), OJ L 299, 8 November 2008, pp. 
25–33, as well as in the Memorandum on the Creation od the EEC Trade Mark, SEC (76) 2462 
final, 6 July 1976), Bulletin of the European Communities, Suppl. 8, 1976., para. 68.
9 Advocate general Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer has qualified as “simplistic reductionism” the 
view limiting the function of the trademark to an indication of origin. Opinion of Advocate 
General Colomer in CJEU case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v Matthew Reed, 12 
November 2002, EU:C:2002:373, para. 46. It is interesting to see that Advocate General Jacobs 
perceived the other functions as derivatives of the function of origin and merit not too wide an 
interpretation. See Opinion of the Advocate General Jacobs in CJEU case C-337/95, Christian 
Dior SA and Parfums Christian Dior BV v Evora BV, 29 April 1997, EU:C:1997:222, para. 42.
10 CJEU, C-323/09, Interflora Inc. and Interflora British Unit v Marks & Spencer plc and Flowers 
Direct Online Ltd., 22 September 2011, EU:C:2011:604, paras. 38-40. 
11 CJEU, joined cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France SARL and Google Inc. v Louis 
Vuitton Malletier SA (C-236/08), Google France SARL v Viaticum SA and Luteciel SARL 
(C-237/08) and Google France SARL v Centre national de recherche en relations humaines 
(CNRRH) SARL and Others (C-238/08), 23 March 2010, EU:C:2010:159, para. 91.
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play when the rightholder is using its trademark “to acquire or preserve a reputation 
capable of attracting consumers and retaining their loyalty”.12
One of the contemporary approaches to viewing the plurality of functions of the 
trademark is known as the theory of information. The trademark is seen as a means 
to convey information to consumers, at the same time improving the efficiency on 
the market.13 According to this theory, the functions of trademark may be divided 
into several subfunctions where a crucial one is the traditional essential function of 
communicating the origin of goods (or services). Other, more recently recognised 
functions, came about as a result of the transformation in trade practices, where 
consumers are distanced from the producers because the distribution channels are 
increasingly diverse. An important secondary function is the information about the 
quality, according to which a trademark guarantees the quality (and price) level, 
which the consumer expects from the product (or service) bearing that trademark.14 
There is also a descriptive function, which may sometimes exist although in principle 
descriptive trademarks are not registrable. However, some trademarks suggest 
certain characteristics of goods (or services) in relation to which they are used.15 An 
increasingly important function in the todays’ commercial practices is the advertising 
function enabling the consumer to connect a specific overall image, aura or lifestyle 
with an individual trademark, which occurs as a result of the way in which the 
trademark is being advertised.16 Griffiths describes this as a physiological possessing 
12 CJEU, C-323/09, Interflora, EU:C:2011:604, para. 60.
13 On trademarks as a means of communication of information see, Opinion of the Advocate 
General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in CJEU case C-273/00, Ralf Sieckmann, 6 November 2001, 
EU:C:2001:594, paras. 16-21. See also Schreiner, R., Die Dienstleistungsmarke, Typus, 
Rechtsschutz und Funktion (Munich: Heymanns, 1983), pp. 448 et seq.; Strasser, M., Rational 
Basis of Trademark Protection Revisited: Putting the Dilution Doctrine into Context, 10 
Fordham Intellectual Property Media & Entertainment Law Journal (1999–2000), pp. 375-432, 
especially p. 382.
14 On this issue see more Griffits, A., Trade Marks and Quality Assurance, in: Dinwoodie, G. B. 
(ed.), Methods and Perspectives in intellectual Property, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013), 
pp. 129-150.
15 Kitchin D. et al. (eds.), Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, 14th ed., (London: 
Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), p. 143.
16 Opinion of Advocate General Colomer in CJEU case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc 
v Matthew Reed, 12 November 2002, EU:C:2002:373, para. 47: “The messages it sends out 
are, moreover, autonomous. A distinctive sign can indicate at the same time trade origin, the 
reputation of its proprietor and the quality of the goods it represents, but there is nothing to 
prevent the consumer, unaware of who manufactures the goods or provides the services which 
bear the trade mark, from acquiring them because he perceives the mark as an emblem of 
prestige or a guarantee of quality. When I regard the current functioning of the market and 
the behaviour of the average consumer, I see no reason whatever not to protect those other 
functions of the trade mark and to safeguard only the function of indicating the trade origin of 
the goods and services.” (notes omitted). The idea of protection of image of the trademark has 
been present in national case law, see e.g. L´Oréal S.A. & others v. Bellure & others, Perfume 
Smell-Alikes, 4 October 2006, [2006] EWHC 2355 (Ch), accessible at http://www.bailii.org/ew/
cases/EWHC/Ch/2006/2355.html (last visited 25 August 2018), where High Court for England 
and Wales, Chancery Division explained that brand is a wider concept than trademark and 
that it is intended to convey the message about its distinctiveness to the consumer, where the 
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of the consumer’s mind, which attributes to the trademark the market power above the 
one that would be consistent to its reputation.17 On the other side, Chronopoulos argues 
that the advertising function is justified by welfare aspects of dynamic competition 
with differentiated products, meaning that it ultimately benefits the consumers.18 
Hence, the functions of trademarks are inseparably related to the consumer society 
and enable the consumer to make an informed choice among a variety of goods (and 
services) on the market. Besides, trademarks are an indispensable means of promoting 
trade, and in the EU they also facilitate inter-MS trade and further interpenetration of 
MS national markets.19 
From the perspective of the rightholder, the trademark, being an exclusive right, 
induces the rightholder to promote the reputation of its trademark, and of goods (and 
services) in relation to which it is used, resting assured that others will not be able to 
free-ride on that reputation.20 This corresponds to the concept of the “specific subject-
matter” recognised in the CJEU case law. It means “in particular the guarantee to the 
proprietor of the trademark that he has the exclusive right to use that trademark for 
the purpose of putting a product into circulation for the first time and therefore his 
protection against competitors wishing to take advantage of the status and reputation 
of the mark by selling products illegally bearing that trademark.”21 This may be 
explained under the utilitarian theory because exclusiveness of the trademark provides 
incentives for rightholders to maintain and improve goods (and services) offered to the 
public and set appropriate price, by giving them property rights in what they create. 
If captured by the ethical argument based on the principle of justice and fairness, 
persons other than rightholders should not be able to benefit from reputation and other 
attributes of the trademarks. This is also an element of the wider protection which 
traders should be able to acquire based on the competition rules,22 leading to the above 
statement that the IP law and competition law may not only be in opposition to each 
other but may also overlap. Whatever the case, both sets of rules reflect an attempt 
to establish the balance between public and private interests. In trademark law, the 
notions of “essential function” (but also other functions) and “specific subject-matter” 
serve as a measure.23
trademark is just one element of the brand structure. Therefore, the trademark holder has the 
right to protection of the image represented by the trademark.
17 Griffiths, A., The Impact of the Global Appreciation Approach on the Boundaries of Trade 
Mark Protection, (2001) Intellectual Property Quarterly 5, pp. 326-360, especially p. 329. 
18 Chronopoulos, A., Legal and economic arguments for the protection of advertising value 
through trade mark law, (2014) Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property (4)4, pp. 256-276, 
especially 267.
19 Memorandum on the Creation of the EEC Trade Mark, SEC (76) 2462 final, 6 July 1976), 
Bulletin of the European Communities, Suppl. 8, 1976, para. 21.
20 See, defining the “specific subject-matter”, CJEU, C-10/89, SA CNL-SUCAL NV v HAG 
GF AG (Hag II), 17 October 1990, EU:C:1990:359, para, 14; Opinion of Advocate General 
Jacobs in CJEU case C-10/89, SA CNL-SUCAL NV v HAG GF AG (Hag II), 13 March 1990, 
EU:C:1990:112, para. 19.
21 CJEU, C-3/78, Centrafarm, EU:C:1978:174, para. 11.
22 Bently, L., Sherman, B., op. cit., pp. 700-702.
23 CJEU, C-10/89, Hag II, EU:C:1990:359, para. 18. See also, CJEU, C-102/77, Hoffmann-La 
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3. WHY CHOOSE THE SDS FOR LUXURY PRODUCTS?
Because of these trademark functions and economic conditions in which the 
luxury brands in particular operate in an optimum level, luxury products have always 
been under special distribution regimes controlled by their producers. Despite global 
digitalisation of the market and developing e-commerce models, a few producers 
prefer to retain full control by maintaining their own distribution network and some 
even refuse to sell over the internet.24 Many others wish to capitalise on the fast-
growing online sale of luxury goods25 and have embraced e-commerce to improve 
accessibility of their products.26 Having said that, accessibility is actually at odds with 
the definition of luxury, which is basically revolving around (very) high price and 
unavailability to (vast) majority of consumers. With that comes prestige as a more 
important feature than the product’s functionality.27 For this reason, luxury brand 
producers are extremely concerned about preserving the image of their brands by 
maintaining the high-end experience and exclusivity perception also in the digital 
environment. They wish to create an internet distribution system which would 
mirror their brick-and-mortar distribution strategy, but at the same time to create an 
omnichannel approach with synergic effect among all communication and distribution 
channels resulting in a single brand presence. In order to accommodate these goals, 
luxury brand producers often rely on the selective distribution system (hereinafter: 
SDS).
In competition law, SDS is defined as “a distribution system where the supplier 
undertakes to sell the contracts goods or services, either directly or indirectly, only 
to distributors selected on the basis of specified criteria and where these distributors 
undertake not to sell such goods or services to unauthorised distributors within the 
territory reserved by the supplier to operate that system.”28 Such a system seems to 
accommodate well the suppliers’ need to differentiate between luxury products and 
potentially competing non-luxury products, because it enables them to control the 
distribution network, both online and offline, by way of setting up quality criteria 
that a distributor has to fulfil in order to become an authorised distributor. In order 
to preserve the “aura of luxury” in the context of online sales, the supplier may, for 
instance, want to impose quality standards relating to the high-end look and feel of 
Roche v Centrafarm, 23 May 1978, EU:C:1978:108, para. 7; CJEU, C-3/78, Centrafarm, 
EU:C:1978:174, paras. 11-12; CJEU, C-10/89, Hag II, EU:C:1990:359, para. 14; CJEU, 
C-317/91, Deutsche Renault v Audi, 30 November 1993, EU:C:1993:908, para. 21.
24 For instance, Chanel is not selling its fashion items over the Internet, merely marketing them. 
See at www. chanel.com (last visited 22 August 2018).
25 Online sales continued to climb, increasing by 24% in 2017 according to Bain and Co. Luxury 
Goods Worldwide Market Study, Fall–Winter 2017, http://www.bain.de/Images/BAIN_
REPORT_Global_Luxury_Report_2017.pdf (last visited 2 August 2018), p. 15.
26 Major retailer sites include, for instance, www.24sevres.com, www.net-a-porter.com, www.
farfetch.com and www.bonobos.com (last visited 22 August 2018). 
27 See Eastman, J. K., Goldsmith, R. E., Flynn, L. R., Status Consumption in Consumer Behavior: 
Scale Development and Validation, (1999) Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice 7, pp. 41-
52, especially p. 41.
28 Article 1(e) of the VBER (see fn. 54). 
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the website; product presentation and website design, criteria for the domain name, 
the use of navigation tools, the use of banners and the like. These are the online 
counterparts of the traditional offline quality standard, which include a certain size 
of the bricks-and-mortar shops, a specific geographic location, well-designed interior 
using particular fixtures, furnishing, and lightening all of which reflect the luxury 
image of the product in question, or imposing some specific criteria linked to the 
nature of the product.29 
With the purpose of fully controlling the distribution network, in addition to 
setting up the distribution network criteria, the supplier will normally also impose 
to the appointed distributors a prohibition not to sell the products in question to non-
approved distributors (cross-selling). As such, an SDS is of closed character. Not 
only that the luxury brand producers avoid price pressure from low-cost retailers or 
discounters, they also protect their investment in the brand’s reputation and prevent 
its dilution because they are able to ensure that sales are carried out within conditions 
which benefit the prestige of their luxury goods.30 In explaining his economic 
arguments in favour of the SDS for branded products, Winter reiterates the conflict 
of interests between producer of the luxury products and downstream distributors. 
While the former is interested in the profitability of its overall distribution system, the 
distributors are concerned only about their own sales. Not having a sufficient share 
in the profits to invest in the brand’s image, sales conditions with individual retailers 
need to be controlled by the producer.31 If the producer would be denied the control 
over the entirety of the distribution system, it would run the risk of some retailers 
free-riding off the investment of other participants in the system.32 By restricting sales 
only to authorised distributors, luxury brand suppliers succeed in controlling market 
positioning, distribution quality and information flows in addition to the core brand 
integrity. SDS also facilitates client specific investment and know-how transfers which 
make two important factors in maintaining the reputation of a luxury brand.33 Already 
in the 1990s, the GCEU recognised that preserving an “aura of luxury” in distributing 
luxury products is a legitimate interest of the luxury brand owners. The two Lecrec 
judgments34 dealt respectively with Yves Saint Laurent and Givenchy luxury products 
and for its eloquence, the Court’s reasoning merits being cited in full:
“[I]t is in the interests of consumers seeking to purchase luxury 
cosmetics that the luxury image of such products is not tarnished, as 
they would otherwise no longer be regarded as luxury products. The 
29 European Commission, Staff Working Document, Preliminary Report on the E-commerce 
Sector Inquiry, SWD (2016) 312 final, para. 216 (b).
30 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ C 130, 19.5.2010, pp. 1-46, para. 178.
31 Winter, R. A., Pierre Fabre, Coty and Restrictions on Internet Sales: An Economist’s Perspective, 
(2018) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 9(3), pp. 183-187, especially 187.
32 Waelbroeck, D., Davies, Z., Coty, Clarifying Competition Law in the Wake of Pierre Fabre, 
(2018) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 9(7), pp. 431-442, p. 435.
33 See in details Ezrachi, A. The Ripple Effects of Online Marketplace Bans, (2017) World 
Competition 40(1), pp. 47-65, chapter 3.
34 GCEU, T-19/92, Leclerc v Commission (YSL), 12 December 1996, EU:T:1996:190; GCEU, 
T-88/92, Leclerc v Commission (Givenchy), 12 December 1996, EU:T:1996:192.
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current segmentation of the cosmetics sector between luxury and non-
luxury cosmetics reflects the varying needs of consumers and thus is 
not improper in economic terms. Although the ‘luxury’ nature of luxury 
cosmetics also derives, inter alia, from their high intrinsic quality, 
their higher price and manufacturers’ advertising campaigns, the fact 
that they are sold through selective distribution systems which seek to 
ensure that they are presented in retail outlets in an enhancing manner 
also contributes to that luxury image and thus to the preservation of 
one of the main characteristics of the products which consumers seek to 
purchase. Generalized distribution of the products at issue, as a result of 
which Yves Saint Laurent would have no opportunity of ensuring that 
its products were sold in appropriate conditions, would entail the risk of 
deterioration in product presentation in retail outlets which could harm 
the ‘luxury image’ and thus the very character of the products.”35
The GCEU thus confirmed that the luxury image of a product is not only linked 
to its quality, but to other factors as well, and that it is in the interest of consumers to 
enable manufacturers to safeguard the luxury image of their branded goods through 
a qualitative SDS, which might enhance competition. There are also other potential 
benefits to an SDS from the competition-law standpoint.36 For one, it promotes non-
price competition and improves the quality of services;37 it brings about uniformity 
and quality standardisation on the distributors, thereby making the product in question 
more attractive to buyers which increases its sales;38 it provides protection from free-
riding and hold-up problems;39 and by helping to create a brand image of luxury, it 
may foster inter-brand competition.40 Having in mind all these benefits, SDS is often 
selected as the means of distributing branded products.41
4. EU COMPETITION LAW FRAMEWORK FOR SDS
Distribution contracts, including those on selective distribution, have always 
been an issue of interest to competition lawyers due to their potential negative 
effects on the market. Designed to restrict the number of authorised distributors and 
35 GCEU, T-19/92, Leclerc v Commission (YSL), EU:T:1996:190, para. 120.
36 For a detailed analysis of SDS in the context of Internet sales in particular see, Iacobucci, 
E., Winter, R. A., European Law on Selective Distribution and Internet Sales: An Economic 
Perspective, (2016) Antitrust Law Journal 81, pp. 47-64.
37 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 106.
38 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 107(i).
39 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 107(a)-(e). A more detailed discussion on effects of 
SDS see, Buccirossi, P., Vertical Restraints on E-Commerce and Selective Distribution, (2015) 
Journal of Competition Law & Economics 11(3), pp. 747-773.
40 Rose V., Baily, D., (eds.), Bellamy & Child European Union Law of Competition, 7th ed., 
(Oxford: Oxford University Publishing, 2013), p. 453.
41 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 174.
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the possibilities of resale42 they risk reducing intra-brand competition,43 foreclosing 
some type of distributors, softening competition and facilitating collusion between 
suppliers or buyers,44 all of which are very serious competition concerns. For these 
reasons, such contracts might be qualified as anti-competitive under EU primary law, 
i.e. Article 101 of the TFEU.
Article 101(1) is one of the cornerstones of EU competition law, prohibiting 
agreements which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. This very 
broadly worded provision is by no means simple or self-explanatory, as the TFEU 
does not even attempt to define any of the concepts used within it – that was left to 
the CJEU, which has developed a vast body of case law on this complex topic. For 
the purposes of this paper, it is important to stress only a few basic features of the 
functioning of Article 101 TFEU. 
In order to be caught by the prohibition of Art 101(1), the conduct in question must 
amount to an agreement between two or more independent undertakings, a concerted 
practice or a decision by the association of undertakings as defined by the CJEU.45 
Such an agreement must be restrictive either by object or effect which should not be 
read in conjunction, as it is settled case law, that agreements are examined for their 
effects on competition only insofar as their object is not the restriction of competition.46 
This divide will prove to be important in cases of SDS as will be explained below. 
In addition, such agreements must threaten to restrict competition in an appreciable 
manner,47 and must affect trade between Member States.48 Article 101 offers a non-
42 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 174.
43 Intra-brand competition is competition among retailers or distributors of the same brand. Intra-
brand competition may be on price or non-price terms. Glossary of Industrial Organisation 
Economics and Competition Law, compiled by Khemani, R. S., and Shapiro, D. M., 
commissioned by the Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, (1993), 
available at https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3153 (last visited 10 September 
2018).
44 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 175.
45 For a more detailed discussion see, Rose, V., Baily, D. (eds.), op. cit., pp. 99 et seq.
46 CJEU, C-56/65, Société Technique Minière v Machinenbau Ulm, 30 June 1966, EU:C:1966:38, 
p. 249. In other words, if it is found that the object of the agreement is to restrict competition, 
it is not necessary to carry out a detailed market analysis to examine its actual effects on 
competition. See CJEU, joined cases 56 and 58-64, Consten and Grundig v Commission, 13 
July 1966, EU:C:1966:41, p. 342; and other (for a more detailed discussion see Rose, V., Baily, 
D., (eds.), op. cit., pp. 149 et seq.). Conversely, where the object is not restrictive it is necessary 
to undertake a full competition analysis, which in the context of vertical agreements such as 
selective distribution agreements, imply taking into account a number of factors such as the 
nature of the agreements, market position of the parties, competitors and buyers, entry barriers, 
maturity of the market, level of trade, nature of products and other factors. See Guidelines on 
Vertical Restraints, paras. 111 et seq.
47 Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict 
competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (de 
minimis) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ C 368, 22.12.2001, pp. 13-15.
48 If an agreement does not affect trade between MSs, Article 101 of the TFEU will not apply. 
However, it is likely that such a conduct will fall under the scope of the comparable competition 
law provision of the affected MS. 
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exhaustive list of types of agreements covered by prohibition which includes examples 
of both horizontal and vertical restraints, the latter covering the SDSs.49 By wording 
of Article 101(2) such agreements are ex lege void and undertakings involved may 
as a result be subject to high administrative fines.50 Having regard to the fact that 
most market conducts rarely bring about only negative effects on the market, Article 
101(3) sets out an exception rule to the above-described prohibition in cases where 
the benefits outweigh negative effects on competition.51 Exemption criteria of Article 
101(3) are presumed to be fulfilled in cases of agreements falling under any of the 
block exemption regulations52 enacted by the Council or the Commission, in which 
case the prohibition in Article 101(1) does not apply.53 
Falling under the category of vertical agreements, selective distribution 
agreements may be exempt from application of competition law under the Vertical 
Block Exemption Regulation (hereinafter: VBER),54 which creates a general 
presumption of legality for vertical agreements, provided that the market share of 
49 The respective part of Article 101(1) of the TFEU reads:
 (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
 (b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
 (c) share markets or sources of supply;
 (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
 (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with 
the subject of such contracts.
50 CJEU, C-230/96, Cabour SA and Nord Distribution Automobile SA v Arnor “SOCO” 
SARL, supported by Automobiles Peugeot SA and Automobiles Citroën SA., 30 April 1998, 
EU:C:1998:181, para. 48; CJEU, C-39/92, Petróleos de Portugal – Petrogal SA v Correia 
Simões & CO. Ldª and Correia Sousa & Crisóstomo Ldª,10 November 1993, EU:C:1993:874, 
para. 68.
51 The exception rules serve as a defence against the finding of an infringement if the parties 
involved successfully prove that the agreement in question: a) contributes to improving 
the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, b) 
allows consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not c) imposes on the 
undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these 
objectives; d) affords such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of 
a substantial part of the products in question.
52 Block exemption regulations are “Regulations, issued by the Commission or by the Council 
pursuant to Article 101(3) of the TFEU specifying the conditions under which certain types of 
agreements are exempted from the prohibition of restrictive agreements laid down in Article 
101(1) of the TFEU. When an agreement fulfils the conditions set out in a block exemption 
regulation, the agreement is automatically valid and enforceable. Block exemption regulations 
exist, for instance, for vertical agreements, R&D agreements, specialisation agreements, 
technology transfer agreements and car distribution agreements.” Glossary of competition 
terms available at https://www.concurrences.com/en/glossary-of-competition-terms/Block-
exemption-regulation (last visited 16 September 2018).
53 Rose, V., Baily, D., (eds.), Bellamy & Child European Union Law of Competition, 7th ed., 
Oxford: Oxford University Publishing, 2013, p. 214.
54 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and 
concerted practices OJ L 102, 2010, 23.4.2010, p. 1.
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each of the parties of the agreement does not exceed the 30% threshold and that the 
agreement does not contain any of the listed hard-core restrictions to competition.55 
Undertakings themselves have to verify whether the agreement that they have entered 
into is covered by the presumption of legality set out in the VBER. Very helpful in 
that regard are the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints,56 a soft law document issued by 
the Commission which is meant to help undertakings in self-assessing their vertical 
agreement under EU competition law. Guidelines explain that even if the agreement 
does not fall within the exemption of VBER, this does not automatically imply that 
such an agreement is void. If covered by Article 101(1), the agreement may still 
benefit from an individual exemption under Article 101(3).57 Following the structure 
of Article 101, the undertakings of a selective distribution agreement will usually take 
the following self-assessment steps: (a) They establish their respective market shares. 
(b) They have to make sure the agreement does not contain any of the hard-core and 
excluded restrictions set out in VBER. If the relevant market share of each party does 
not exceed the 30 % threshold and there are no hard-core and excluded restrictions, 
the agreement is covered by the safe harbour of VBER and the agreement is presumed 
to be legal. (c) If the 30 % market share threshold is exceeded for either and/or both 
of the parties, the undertakings should assess whether their agreement falls within 
Article 101(1). (d) If falling under Art 101(1), it is necessary to examine whether the 
agreement fulfils the conditions for exemption under Article 101(3).58
Whether an SDS will be caught by Article 101 depends on a variety of 
factors. To begin with, it depends upon the type of SDS put in place. Guidelines on 
Vertical Restrains differentiate between purely qualitative and quantitative selective 
distribution, the latter referring to the selection of “dealers only on objective criteria 
required by the nature of the products,” and the application of such criteria does not 
limit the number of dealers.59 It is generally considered that purely qualitative selective 
distribution falls outside the application of Article 101(1) when the criteria developed 
by the CJEU in cases Metro I60 and Metro II61 have been met. 
The first Metro criterion refers to the characteristics of the product. The CJEU 
ruled that the nature of goods must necessitate setting up an SDS to maintain the 
quality of products and ensure their proper use.62 Second, the dealers must be chosen 
on the ground of objective qualitative criteria applicable to all potential dealers equally 
and non-discriminatory. Third, the selection criteria must be proportionate, i.e. they 
should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the legitimate objective.63 Almost 
55 Article 3(1) of the VBER. 
56 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ C 130, 19.5.2010, pp. 1-46.
57 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 96.
58 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 110.
59 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 175.
60 CJEU, C-26/76, Metro v Commission (Metro I), 25 October 1977, EU:C:1977:167 
61 CJEU, C-75/84 Metro v Commission ( Metro II), 22 October 1986, EU:C:1986:399
62 The most typical category of such products are hi-technology items requiring specialist advice 
and appropriate after-sale service, such as cars, cameras, certain electronic equipment, clocks 
and watches and computers. Whish, R., Baily, D., Competition Law, 7th ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012, p. 642.
63 CJEU, C-26/76, Metro I, EU:C:1977:167, paras. 20-21; Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 
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a decade into this judgment, the CJEU in Metro II64 acknowledged a limitation to the 
presumptive legality of an SDS upon the fulfilment of the named criteria. Namely, the 
CJEU found that an SDS might nevertheless be restrictive where the number of such 
distribution systems operating on the market negatively influences competition by 
way of their collective effect. In such a situation, there might be no room left for other 
forms of distribution systems or, it might result in rigidity of the price structure.65 With 
that in mind, the CJEU formulated the fourth requirement to the presumptive legality 
of an SDS under Article 101(1) – the cumulative effect of SDSs must not preclude 
other forms of distributions on the market.66 Although some have criticised the Metro 
criteria for being, inter alia, overly formalistic,67 they continue to be successfully 
applied as demonstrated by the structure of the CJEU judgments that followed, 
including the recent ones discussed below. 
However, prior to dealing with those judgments one needs to keep in mind the 
background to part of the current controversy related to the justification of the SDS for 
luxury products, which becomes relevant under the first Metro criterion. As already 
mentioned,68 back in the 1990s, in the two Lecrec judgments69 the GCEU ruled that 
the characteristics and the “aura of luxury” of branded products justify setting up 
an SDS. Its reasoning mentions sophistication and high-quality of luxury cosmetics, 
and in particular luxury perfumes, and their distinctive “luxury image” which is 
important in the eyes of consumers. The characteristics of those products cannot be 
limited to their material characteristics, but also encompass the specific perception 
that consumers have of them, in particular their “luxury image”, which thus arises 
from their very nature. In the GCEU’s view, it is in the interests of consumers seeking 
to purchase such products that they are appropriately presented in retail outlets and 
that their luxury image is preserved in that way. The Court reasoned that “criteria 
aimed at ensuring that the products are presented in retail outlets in a manner which 
is in keeping with their luxury nature constitute a legitimate requirement of such a 
kind as to enhance competition in the interests of consumers within the meaning of 
the case-law.”70 Therefore, in the luxury cosmetics sector, qualitative criteria for the 
175.
64 CJEU, C-75/84, Metro II, EU:C:1986:399.
65 CJEU, C-75/84, Metro II, EU:C:1986:399, para. 40.
66 Subsequently, the GCEU held that where most suppliers use qualitative SDS that does not 
necessarily mean they are covered by Article 101(1), as this will depend on the existence of 
the barriers to entry on the relevant market and the strength of price competition. See GCEU, 
T-19/92, Leclerc v Commission (YSL), 12 December 1996, EU:T:1996:190, para. 182; GCEU, 
T-88/92, Leclerc v Commission (Givenchy), 12 December 1996, EU:T:1996:192, para. 174. For 
a more detailed account see, Rose, V., Baily, D., (eds.), Bellamy & Child European Union Law 
of Competition, 7th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Publishing, 2013, pp. 461-462.
67 Witt, A. E., Restrictions on the use of third-party platforms in selective distribution agreements 
for luxury goods, (2016) European Competition Journal 12, pp. 435-461, especially p. 442 and 
fn. 35. 
68 See Chapter 3.
69 GCEU, T-19/92, Leclerc v Commission (YSL), 12 December 1996, EU:T:1996:190; GCEU, 
T-88/92, Leclerc v Commission (Givenchy), 12 December 1996, EU:T:1996:192.
70 GCEU, T-19/92, Leclerc v Commission (YSL), EU:T:1996:190, para. 120.
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selection of retailers which do not go beyond what is necessary to ensure that those 
products are suitably presented for sale are in principle not covered by what today is 
Article 101(1) of the TFEU, in so far as they are objective, laid down uniformly for all 
potential retailers and not applied in a discriminatory fashion. 
While the two Lecrec judgments dealt with SDS in the context of offline sales 
of luxury products, with the rise of the importance of online selling, more recently 
the CJEU explored the extent to which manufacturers may restrict online sales as 
a legitimate means of protecting the luxury image of their goods. Particularly 
important in that regard are judgments in Pierre Fabre71 and, more recently, Coty.72 
The former judgment, dealing with an SDS for branded cosmetics and personal 
care products which contained a clause de facto banning internet sales by limiting 
the sales to pharmacies with the pharmacist present, prompted vivid debates as it 
appeared to have reversed the findings in the Lecrec judgments. What soon proved 
to be a controversial part of CJEU reasoning in Pierre Fabre states that “[t]he aim of 
maintaining a prestigious image is not a legitimate aim for restricting competition and 
cannot therefore justify a finding that a contractual clause pursuing such an aim does 
not fall within Article 101(1) TFEU.”73 This one-sentence paragraph has triggered 
many reactions. Because it fails to take account of the consumers’ interest in having 
the option of purchasing prestigious products at higher price, and not necessarily in 
promotion of lower prices over the product image, the judgment in Pierre Fabre has 
been criticised as a “paternalistic decision”.74 That the focus of the consumers of the 
luxury products is on the prestigious image of that product (inducing happiness and 
confidence, being first to have it, having the latest trend, showing off, distinguishing 
from common), rather than simply on the quality of the product may be concluded 
based on some consumer behaviour research.75 In addition, the critics of the Pierre 
Fabre emphasised the more theoretical problem with the lack of logic in the argument 
that the general internet sale prohibition is restriction by object if not objectively 
justified, and at the same time, maintaining prestigious image may not constitute 
justification despite being the foremost reason for putting an SDS in place.76 In a 
view of potentially adverse effects the cited paragraph in Pierre Fabre could have 
had upon the future of the luxury brands, the judgment in Coty is seen as a welcome 
step towards recognising the economic arguments and softening down the hardness of 
Pierre Fabre. Along these lines is also the comment that competition law should be 
dealing with IP rights in a way to protect their substantive core from the scrutiny of 
71 CJEU, C-439/09, Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS v Président de l’Autorité de la 
concurrence and Ministre de l’Économie, de l’Industrie et de l’Emploi, 13 October 2011, 
EU:C:2011:649.
72 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941.
73 CJEU, C-439/09, Pierre Fabre, EU:C:2011:649, para. 46.
74 Winter, R. A., Pierre Fabre, Coty and Restrictions on Internet Sales: An Economist’s Perspective, 
(2018) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 9(3), pp. 183-187, especially 187.
75 According to the Deloitte Luxury Multicountry Survey for Global Powers of Luxury Goods 
2017, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/consumer-industri-
al-products/gx-cip-global-powers-luxury-2017.pdf (last visited 2 August 2018).
76 Buccirossi, P., op. cit., pp. 768-769.
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competition law.77 Therefore, the following pages discuss Coty in detail. The analysis 
evolves around the question of whether a producer of luxury products may by virtue 
of the SDS prohibit its distributors from selling these products through a third-party 
internet platform without infringing Article 101 of the TFEU. The answer given by 
the CJEU suggests that the internet sales of luxury goods need deluxe competition law 
treatment in order to enable the producers to preserve the deluxe image. However, the 
situation is not without complexity as explained below.
5. THE FACTS IN COTY
The dispute has arisen out of the long-term business relationship between the 
company Coty Germany GmbH, which is one of the leading producers of luxury 
cosmetic products in Germany, and company Parfümerie Akzente GmbH, which acts 
as an authorised distributor for those products. Distribution on the German market and 
markets of some other MSs is traditionally carried out in physical stores, and more 
recently over the internet.78 Internet sales are made through Parfümerie Akzente’s 
online store79 and through the platform amazon.de managed by several companies 
belonging to the Amazon group of companies established in Luxembourg.80 Coty 
Germany was not in agreement with the retail via Amazon and requested Parfümerie 
Akzente to cease using this distribution channel. 
Prior to that, the two companies concluded a selective distribution contract 
which provides that each of the distributor’s sales locations must be approved by 
Coty Germany, which implies compliance with a number of requirements relating 
to their environment, décor and furnishing. The contract also states that “the décor 
and furnishing of the sales location, the selection of goods, advertising and the sales 
presentation must highlight and promote the luxury character of Coty Prestige’s 
brands”, what was the earlier company name of the plaintiff.81 In addition, the 
contract included a supplemental agreement on internet sales according to which 
“the authorised retailer is not permitted to use a different name or to engage a third-
party undertaking which has not been authorised”.82 Subsequent to entry into force of 
the VBER,83 Parfümerie Akzente refused to accept the modifications to the selective 
distribution contract and the supplemental agreement whereby “the authorised retailer 
is entitled to offer and sell the products on the internet, provided, however, that 
that internet sales activity is conducted through an ‘electronic shop window’ of the 
authorised store and the luxury character of the products is preserved”. Likewise, 
77 Schmidt-Kessen, M. J., Selective Distribution Systems in EU Competition and EU Trademark 
Law: Resolving the Tension, (2018) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 9(5), pp. 
304-316,
78 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, paras. 8 and 9.
79 See https://www.parfumdreams.de/ (last visited 15 August 2018).
80 See https://www.amazon.de/gp/help/customer/display.html?ie=UTF8&nodeId=505050 (last 
visited 15 August 2018).
81 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, paras. 11 and 12.
82 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, para. 14.
83 OJ L 102, 23 April 2010, p. 1.
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the supplemental agreement expressly prohibits the use of a different business name 
as well as the recognisable engagement of a third-party undertaking which is not an 
authorised retailer of Coty Prestige.84
In the wake of disagreement between the companies, Coty Germany logged 
a lawsuit against the Parfümerie Akzente before the Regional Court, Frankfurt am 
Main (Landgericht Frankfurt am Main), seeking an order prohibiting the defendant 
from distributing products bearing the brand at issue via the platform amazon.de. 
The court of first instance dismissed the application holding that a contractual clause 
in supplemental agreement is in violation of the German law against the restriction 
of competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen) or Article 101(1) of the 
TFEU, and in particular in the light of the earlier CJEU judgment in Pierre Fabre.85 
The national court explained that the aim of preserving a prestige brand image does not 
justify the introduction of an SDS which by definition restricts competition. It further 
stated that not only that it does not merit block exemption, but also does not qualify 
for an individual exemption, since it has not been shown that the general exclusion 
of internet sales via third-party platforms entails efficiency gains of such a kind as 
to offset the disadvantages for competition that result from the clause at issue. The 
national court also considered that such general prohibition was not necessary because 
there are alternative means less restrictive of competition, such as the application of 
specific quality criteria for the third-party platforms.86
Deciding on the plaintiff’s appeal, the Higher Regional Court, Frankfurt am Main 
(Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main) stayed the proceedings seeking assistance by 
the CJEU in the preliminary ruling proceedings.
6. THE JUDGMENT IN COTY
6.1. The compatibility of SDS for luxury goods with Article 101(1) of the 
TFEU
The first question addressed by the CJEU related to the compatibility of SDSs, 
having as their aim the distribution of luxury goods and primarily serving to preserve 
a “luxury image” of the goods, with Article 101(1) of the TFEU. Essentially, the 
CJEU ruled in the affirmative. Its reasoning recalls that although an SDS necessarily 
affects competition, it may nevertheless be compatible with Article 101(1) provided 
the Metro criteria described above are fulfilled. This entails that dealers are chosen on 
the ground of qualitative, objective criteria laid down in a non-discriminatory manner, 
that the nature of the product in question necessitates an SDS to preserve the quality 
of products and ensure their proper use and, finally, that the selection criteria are 
proportionate to this objective.87
84 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, para. 15.
85 CJEU, C-439/09, Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS v Président de l’Autorité de la 
concurrence, Ministre de l’Économie, de l’Industrie et de l’Emploi, 13 October 2011, 
EU:C:2011:649.
86 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, paras.16-18.
87 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, para. 24.
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The CJEU found those criteria to have been met. In particular, in relation to the 
third Metro criterion, it analysed the necessity of an SDS for luxury goods, invoking 
its judgment in Copad,88 stemming from trademark protection context, rather than 
competition law. According to Copad, “the quality of luxury goods […] is not just 
the result of their material characteristics, but also of the allure and prestigious image 
which bestows on them an aura of luxury. Since luxury goods are high-class goods, 
the aura of luxury emanating from them is essential in that it enables consumers to 
distinguish them from similar goods. Therefore, an impairment to that aura of luxury 
is likely to affect the actual quality of those goods.”89 It is on these grounds that the 
CJEU found that “the characteristics and conditions of a selective distribution system 
can, in themselves, preserve the quality and ensure the proper use of such goods,”90 
again referring to Copad which relied on a former case law on negative clearance 
under Article 101(3) and by applying the Metro criteria.91 
Following that, the CJEU dealt with the controversial paragraph in the Pierre 
Fabre. It attempted to limit that statement to the facts in Pierre Fabre, which 
distinguish that case from Coty. Namely, in Pierre Fabre a specific contractual clause 
imposing on authorised distributors in SDS a comprehensive prohibition on the 
online sale of the contract goods was at issue,92 while in Coty the clause precluded 
retailers only from selling the contract goods online on third-party platforms which 
are discernible to the customers. Besides, in Pierre Fabre the goods were ordinary 
hygiene and body cosmetics, whereas in Coty the goods were luxurious.93 In a view of 
this CJEU’s technical manoeuvre, the Coty judgment may be seen as a consolidation 
of the established case law,94 but the possible understanding might be that second 
factual distinction reveals CJEU intention to limit the benefits of the Coty judgment 
to luxury goods only.
6.2. The compatibility of the online marketplace ban with Article 101(1) 
of the TFEU
Having found that the SDS of luxury goods, designed to preserve the luxury 
image of those goods, is compatible with Article 101(1), provided Metro criteria 
are fulfilled, the CJEU turned to the legality of the clause prohibiting authorised 
distributors from using, in a discernible manner, third-party platforms for online sale 
of those goods. 
88 CJEU, C-59/08, Copad SA v Christian Dior couture SA and others, 23 April 2009, 
EU:C:2009:260.
89 CJEU, C-59/08, Copad, EU:C:2009:260, paras. 24-26, cited in CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, 
EU:C:2017:941, para. 25.
90 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, para. 26, citing CJEU, C-59/08, Copad, EU:C:2009:260, 
para. 28.
91 CJEU, C-31/80, NV L’Oréal and SA L’Oréal v PVBA “De Nieuwe AMCK”, 11 December 1980, 
EU:C:1980:289, para. 16.
92 Such general prohibition of online sales is considered a hard-core restriction. See e.g. Buccirossi, 
P., op. cit., pp. 763 and 767.
93 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, paras. 31-34.
94 Waelbroeck, D., Davies, Z., op. cit., p. 432.
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The CJEU applied the same analytical structure to the assessment of the 
named contractual clause as for the entire SDS. In other words, here again the Metro 
criteria played the central role. Most sensitive in that regard was the analysis of the 
proportionality of the measure with the pursued aim. It was necessary to explore 
whether the prohibition to use third-party marketplaces as online selling points is 
appropriate prohibition for preserving the luxury image of the goods, and not going 
beyond what is necessary to achieve that goal. 95
Noting that an evaluation of the facts of the case is still indispensable,96 the CJEU 
found that such a prohibition is in principle appropriate97 for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, it noted that such a prohibition provides the supplier with an assurance that 
his luxury goods will be linked solely with the authorised dealers98 allowing him to 
verify that the goods are sold online under the agreed qualitative conditions.99 Rightly, 
the CJEU pointed that such a possibility would not exist in relation to third-party 
platforms due to the lack of a direct contractual relationship between them. This fact 
prevents the supplier from requiring compliance with the SDS quality conditions,100 
risking the deterioration of the online presentation of the products, which in turn 
might “harm their luxury image and thus their very character.”101 The CJEU as well 
pointed out that because such marketplace platforms regularly sell all kinds of goods, 
they cannot preserve the luxury image of luxury goods. This aim, on the other hand, 
is achieved when luxury goods are being sold in the online shops of authorised 
distributors.102 In addition, as AG Wahl noted, such prohibition serves the purpose of 
assuring the “identification of origin of the products”, which is very important “in the 
face of the phenomena of counterfeiting and parasitism, which are likely to restrict 
competition”.103 Although not specifically endorsed by the CJEU, the opinion of AG 
Wahl remains a valid supportive argument to the CJEU’s finding. In fact, a recent 
OECD study shows that e-commerce is a „major enabler for the distribution and sale 
of counterfeit and pirated tangible goods as it opens new possibilities to get access to 
such goods in areas that were traditionally beyond the scope of counterfeiters.”104 This 
is so because counterfeiters can operate across a number of jurisdictions without being 
caught, and are able to switch websites instantly without losing their customer base.105 
Furthermore, the CJEU’s motives largely revolve around recognising that the 
95 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, para. 43.
96 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, para. 41.
97 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, para. 51.
98 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, para. 44.
99 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, para. 47.
100 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, para. 48.
101 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, para. 49.
102 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, para. 50.
103 AG Wahl, Coty Germany GmbH v Parfümerie Akzente GmbH, 26 July 2017, EU:C:2017:603, 
para. 102.
104 OECD/EUIPO, Trade in Counterfeit and Pitted Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact. (OECD 
Publishing Paris 2016), p. 35 available at https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-web/secure/webdav/
guest/document_library/observatory/documents/Mapping_the_Economic_Impact_study/
Mapping_the_Economic_Impact_en.pdf (last visited 23 September 2018).
105 Loc. cit.
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prestigious image is the most important feature of luxury goods in the eyes of the 
consumers.106 This conclusion has to be viewed also against the backdrop of the 
current online market situation. Thus, the CJEU, referring to the results of the 2016 
Preliminary Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, confirmed in the 2017 Final 
Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, sided with the arguments of the Commission 
and Advocate General Wahl pointing out that, regardless of the growing importance 
of online marketplaces operated by third parties, the main distribution channel is still 
the retailers’ own online shops.107 
When it comes to the analysis of proportionality, the CJEU took into account in 
particular the fact that, under the restriction at issue, the authorised distributors were 
still allowed to use internet as a selling means. This included selling though their own 
websites, on condition they have an electronic shop window for the authorised store 
and they preserve the luxury character of the products. Likewise, unauthorised third-
party platforms could have been used as well, so long as the use of such platforms 
was not discernible to the consumer.108 It is on this ground that the CJEU distinguished 
the clause at issue from the absolute ban on online sales found to be incompatible 
with Article 101 of the TFEU in the Pierre Fabre judgment.109 While Pierre Fabre 
related to a de facto absolute ban on online sales, in Coty that was not the case. It is 
clear that both rulings are fact-sensitive and with that in mind, the finding of CJEU 
in Coty should not be understood as endorsing a blanket ban on the use of third-party 
platforms, as the latter might not always be proportionate to the objective pursued. 
However, the main proportionality objection that comes to mind – the authorisation 
to use third-party platforms subject to their compliance with predefined quality 
conditions – has been rejected by the CJEU as not being equally effective as the 
prohibition actually used by Coty due to the lack of direct contractual relationship 
between the suppliers and third-party platforms. The argument used is not all that 
persuasive, as there might be platforms specializing in the sale of luxury goods and 
which are consequently likely to meet the qualitative criteria imposed on authorised 
dealers.110 All considered, the CJEU found the identified vertical restraint presumably 
lawful under Article 101(1).
6.3. The legality of the online marketplace ban under the VBER
Lastly, the referring Court asked whether the clause at issue might benefit from 
the exemption under VBER. In order to fully appreciate the practical implications of 
the interpretation given by the CJEU, it is necessary to reemphasise that the VBER 
106 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, para. 50.
107 Commission Staff Working Document, Preliminary Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, 
Brussels, 15.9.2016, SWD(2016) 312 final, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/sector_
inquiry_preliminary_report_en.pdf (last visited 15 September 2018), para. 48; Report from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Final Report on the E-commerce 
Sector Inquiry, Brussels, 10.5.2017, COM(2017) 229 final, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
antitrust/sector_inquiry_final_report_en.pdf (last visited 15 September 2018), para. 39.
108 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, para. 53.
109 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, para. 52.
110 For a more detailed discussion on this issue, see Witt, A., op. cit., p. 456.
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applies only to agreements caught by the prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU.111 
Because the CJEU in the previous two questions answered that an SDS for luxury 
products as well as the clause restricting the use of third party platforms are compatible 
with Article 101(1) as long as Metro criteria are fulfilled, VBER would be applicable 
only when these criteria would not be met. In other words, if all the conditions were 
satisfied, the VBER would not be applicable at all and the vertical agreements would 
be considered compatible with EU competition rules. Conversely, if caught by Article 
101(1), an agreement such as the present SDS would be covered by the VBER and 
could benefit from the block exemption if the parties to the agreement do not exceed 
the market share threshold defined by the VBER and do not contain any of the hard-
core restrictions listed therein. 
In relation to SDS, and in particular in the context of online sales, the hard-core 
restrictions prone to produce most severe damage to competition are listed in Article 
4 of the VBER, particularly relevant to the case at hand, are points (b) and (c). Article 
4(b) relates to clauses partitioning the market either by territory or by consumer group 
which may be done through an obligation not to sell the products in question to a 
certain group of costumers or in certain territories.112 Article 4(c) on the other hand, 
relates to a restriction of active113 or passive114 sales to end users by members of an 
SDS operating at the retail level of trade. With that in mind, the referring Court asked 
whether the clause prohibiting the use of third-party platforms for the distribution 
of contracted luxury goods, partitions the market by costumer group, or whether it 
restricts passive sales to end consumers.115 
The problem underlining these questions arises from the generally accepted 
understanding that internet sales are a form of passive selling and thus most types 
of restriction to internet sales are likely to be considered as hard-core restraints 
invalidating the safe harbour of the VBER.116 It is in this regard that various forms 
of restrictions on internet sales become very intriguing, and questionable as to their 
compatibility with EU competition law. For instance, the Guidelines on Vertical 
111 Guidelines on vertical restraints, para. 8.
112 In this regard, an exception is a restriction of sales by the members of SDS to unauthorised 
distributors within a territory reserved to the supplier, which is considered to be justified by the 
objectives of an SDS. See Article 4(b)(iii) of the VBER.
113 Guidelines on vertical restraints, para. 51, states: Active sales mean actively approaching 
individual customers inside another distributor’s exclusive territory or exclusive customer 
group by for instance direct mail or visits; or actively approaching a specific customer 
group or customers in a specific territory allocated exclusively to another distributor through 
advertisement in media or other promotions specifically targeted at that customer group or 
targeted at customers in that territory; or establishing a warehouse or distribution outlet in 
another distributor’s exclusive territory.” 
114 Guidelines on vertical restraints, para. 51: “Passive sales mean responding to unsolicited 
requests from individual customers including delivery of goods or services to such customers. 
General advertising or promotion in media or on the Internet that reaches customers in other 
distributors’ exclusive territories or customer groups but which is a reasonable way to reach 
customers outside those territories or customer groups, for instance to reach customers in non-
exclusive territories or in one’s own territory, are passive sales.”
115 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, para. 64.
116 See Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 52.
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restraints state that “within a selective distribution system the dealers should be free 
to sell, both actively and passively, to all end users, also with the help of the internet. 
Therefore, the Commission considers any obligations which dissuade appointed 
dealers from using the internet to reach a greater number and variety of customers 
by imposing criteria for online sales which are not overall equivalent to the criteria 
imposed for the sales from the brick-and-mortar shop as a hard-core restriction.”117 
The CJEU first made it clear that this was not the case of an online selling ban, such 
as the one in Pierre Fabre. Further, it found that it was impossible for a producer to 
identify the third-party costumers among the entirety of its online customers.”118 In 
addition, it held that under certain conditions, the SDS permitted authorised dealers 
to advertise on third-party platforms, and to use online search engines. Using such 
search engines, buyers were usually able to find online offers of authorised dealers.119 
With these arguments in mind, the CJEU found that the prohibition at issue does not 
amount to either the hard-core restriction of the customers, or a restriction on online 
sales within the meaning of Articles 4(b) and (c) of the VBER.
This finding raised an important question: Is the above exemption under VBER 
applicable only in cases of SDS of luxury goods? This is not surprising, as the 
compatibility of the SDS with Article 101(1) rested mainly on the nature of goods, 
i.e. the appropriateness and proportionately of the measures with the objective of 
safeguarding the luxury image of goods. Because of that, one may easily be misguided 
into reading too narrowly the CJEU’s judgment in respect of VBER, limiting its 
exemption to the nature of goods, which “may generate litigation over the prestige of 
some goods”.120 However, such an interpretation would be incorrect.
First, it should be noted that the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints expressly 
state that the VBER exempts both qualitative and quantitative SDS irrespective of 
the nature of the product or the selection criteria.121 This position is very logical for 
a variety of reasons, well explained by the Commission in its brief on the Coty case. 
Because the main purpose of the VBER is to provide legal certainty to parties as to the 
validity of their agreement in relation to Article 101(1) of the TFEU, the assessment of 
hard-core restrictions should not be dependent upon the nature of goods. In addition, 
the Commission points out that while Article 4(c) applies specifically to SDS, Article 
4(b) applies to other types of vertical agreements as well, and thus the nature and 
category of goods cannot be of relevance for its application.122 The repercussions are 
great, as it may be concluded that online marketplace bans, irrespective of the nature 
of the goods concerned and, potentially, irrespective of non-selective distribution 
117 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 56.
118 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, para. 66.
119 CJEU, C-230/16, Coty, EU:C:2017:941, para. 67.
120 Colangelo, G., and Torti, V., Selective Distribution and Online Marketplace Restrictions under 
EU Competition Rules after Coty Prestige, (2018) European Competition Journal 14 (1) pp. 
81-109, p. 104.
121 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 176.
122 EU Commission, EU competition rules and marketplace bans: Where do we stand after the 
Coty judgement? (2018) Competition policy brief 4, p. 4.
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schemes,123 are in CJEU’s view, not hard-core, i.e. restrictions by object under the 
VBER.124 Because marketplace bans are not considered restrictions by object where 
market share threshold does not exceed 30%, even where parties exceed the market 
threshold of 30%, such bans will in all likelihood not constitute restrictions by object 
under Article 101 either. 
7. CONCLUSION
In the context of online retail sales of luxury products, economic policies 
underlying the IP law seem at first sight to run contrary to economic policies inspiring 
competition law. This is because the control exercised by the producer within its SDS 
limits the potential for competition. However, upon careful consideration of the fact 
that in the market segment concerned with luxury product a low price is not the measure 
of competition, the policies seem perfectly aligned. Maintaining prestige and “aura of 
luxury” is a form of effective non-price competition benefiting the consumers. Hence, 
it is desirable to allow SDSs and clauses prohibiting third-party sales via discernible 
platforms as they well-accommodate present needs of the luxury brand producers 
in preserving their investment and successfully operating in the current e-commerce 
environment.
Due to their intrinsic nature, the distribution of luxury goods is best accommodated 
by establishing an SDS. While for decades this was confirmed by CJEU’s case law 
in both competition and trademark fields, Pierre Fabre broke the sequence causing 
uncertainty to the luxury brand producers. In Coty, the CJEU re-established the previous 
case law by limiting the findings in Pierre Fabre to concrete facts of that case, i.e. 
overall internet sale prohibition. The Coty judgments clarifies that when Metro criteria 
are met, SDS and online marketplace prohibition for luxury goods are not contrary 
to competition law and fall outside Article 101(1) of the TFEU, not being restrictive 
either by object or by effect. If Metro criteria are not met, exemption under the VBER 
is available provided the market share threshold is not exceeded since the clause is 
not a hard-core restriction. This rule applies irrespective of the nature of the goods. 
In cases where the 30% market share threshold is exceeded, an individual assessment 
becomes necessary. At this point one may argue that if an online marketplace ban is not 
a restriction by object under VBER, no matter the nature of goods, it should not be a 
restriction by object under 101(1) either, again no matter the nature of goods. Turning 
to the question in the title of this paper about the deluxe version of competition law 
123 Clerckx, S., et al., CJEU Issues Long-Awaited Coty Decision on Luxury Goods Supplier’s 
Online Platform Ban, (2018) The Licencing Journal 2, p. 4.
124 Colomo, P., Case C- 230/16, Coty Germany GmbH: Common sense prevails, Chillin’ Competition 
blog, 6 December 2017, https://chillingcompetition.com/2017/12/06/c%E2%80%91230-16-
coty-germany-gmbh-common-sense-prevails/ (last visited 7 September 2018); Buccirossi, P., 
op. cit.; Clerkx, S., op. cit.; Wealbroeck, D., Davies, Z., Coty, Clarifying Competition Law 
in the Wake of Pierre Fabre, (2018) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 9(7), 
pp. 431-442; Wijckmans, F., Coty Germany GmbH v Parfümerie Akzente GmbH: Possibility 
in Selective Distribution System to Ban Sales via Third-Party Platforms, (2018) Journal of 
Competition Law & Practice 9(6), pp. 373-375.
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for luxury products, it is apparent that no straightforward answer may be given at this 
point. Such understanding would practically erase a distinct competition law treatment 
of luxury and non-luxury goods, contrary to what Coty seems to suggest. However, 
the conundrum created is rather a theoretical concern. For all practical purposes, it is 
may be seen as a hands-off competition policy approach to luxury goods. This should 
ideally benefit the luxury brand producers who will attempt to put in place a carefully 
designed SDS intended to preserve its brand prestige. However, the issue of online 
sales in competition law is far from being solved as demonstrated by recent Asics case 
before the German Bundeskartellamt and Bundesgerichtshof finding the prohibition 
on the use of price comparison sites to be restrictive by object, due to the fact that the 
goods were non-luxury.125 This brings us back to our initial question about the deluxe 
version of competition law for luxury products. It became apparent by now that no 
straightforward answer may be given. After Coty, it is certain that only luxury goods 
enjoy the deluxe competition law treatment in relation to third-party online platform 
bans. For eventual spill-over effects, we will have to wait for new rulings. 
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INTERNETSKA DISTRIBUCIJA LUKSUZNIH PROIZVODA: 
POSTOJI LI DE LUXE INAČICA PRAVA TRŽIŠNOG 
NATJECANJA EU-A?
Zbog svojih posebnih odlika, tržište luksuznih proizvoda područje je zanimanja 
pravnika kao i drugih stručnjaka poput ekonomista ili sociologa. Te odlike imaju 
ključnu ulogu u pravnom uređenju toga tržišta. Polazeći od prava tržišnog natjecanja, 
valja imati na umu da je analiza u okviru članka 101. UFEU-a nepotpuna nedostaje 
li osvrt na politike i pravila prava intelektualnog vlasništva. S porastom važnosti 
internetske prodaje, nova pitanja postavljaju se pred tijela nadležna za tržišno 
natjecanje, poput zakonitosti raznih vrsta online ograničenja u okviru sustava 
selektivne distribucije. Oslanjajući se na pristup koji kombinira pravo intelektualnog 
vlasništva i pravo tržišnog natjecanja, ovaj rad nudi uvid i komentar prakse EU-a s 
prvenstvenim fokusom na noviju presudu Suda EU-a u predmetu Coty. Kompleksnost 
interakcije među različitim pravilima i izuzetcima u pravu tržišnog natjecanja posebno 
je očigledna u tom predmetu. S obzirom na ograničenost presude na konkretne 
okolnosti, presuda u predmetu Coty može poslužiti kao razjašnjenje situacije u odnosu 
na de luxe inačicu prava tržišnog natjecanja samo za određene zabrane online prodaje 
unutar sustava selektivne distribucije, dok će se rasprava i razvoj nacionalne prakse 
nastaviti u očekivanju novih pojašnjenja sa Suda EU-a.
Ključne riječi: pravo EU-a; tržišno natjecanje; intelektualno vlasništvo; žig; 
luksuzni proizvod; internet.
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Zussamenfassung
LUXUSPRODUKTE IM ONLINE-VERTRIEB: 
GIBT ES EINE DELUXE VERSION DES EU-
WETTBEWERBSRECHTS?
Der Markt für Luxusgüter ist aufgrund seiner Besonderheiten interessant 
sowohl für die Juristen als auch für andere Berufe, wie Wirtschaftler und Soziologen. 
Die Charakteristiken der Luxusgüter spielen eine wichtige Rolle bei der rechtlichen 
Regulierung des Marktes. Obwohl man dabei immer vom Wettbewerbsrecht ausgeht, 
die Bewertung des unter Art.101 AEUV fallenden wettbewerbswidrigen Verhaltens 
kann nicht vorgenommen werden, ohne auf die Grundsätze und Regeln des Rechts des 
geistigen Eigentums zurückzugreifen. Mit dem Anstieg des Umsatzes im Online-Handel 
wurden Wettbewerbsbehörden und Berufungsgerichte mit neuen Fragestellungen 
konfrontiert, beispielsweise mit der Legalität verschiedener Restriktionen im Internet 
bezüglich des selektiven Vertriebssystems. Durch den kombinierten Ansatz, der das 
Recht des geistigen Eigentums und das Wettbewerbsrecht einbezieht, bietet dieser 
Beitrag eine Einsicht in und einen Kommentar der EU-Rechtsprechung, wobei 
man auf die Coty-Entscheidung des EuGH besonderen Wert legt. Die Probleme des 
Zusammenspiels von Regeln und Ausnahmen des Wettbewerbsrechts kommen im Fall 
Coty besonders in den Vordergrund. Wegen des beschränkten Sachverhalts kann das 
Coty-Urteil zur Erklärung der Deluxe Wettbewerbsrechtbehandlung nur bei manchen 
Online-Verkaufsverboten im Rahmen des selektiven Vertriebssystems dienen. Es wird 
sicherlich weitere Diskussionen und nationale Rechtsprechungen bezüglich anderer 
wettbewerbsrechtbezogenen Restriktionen im Internet geben, die der EuGH erläutern 
wird. 
Schlüsselwörter: EU-Recht; Wettbewerbsrecht; geistiges Eigentum; Marke; 
Luxusprodukte; Internet; selektiver Vertrieb; vertikale 
Vereinbarungen. 
Riassunto
LA DISTRIBUZIONE VIA INTERNET DEI PRODOTTI DI 
LUSSO: ESISTE UNA VERSIONE DE LUXE DEL DIRITTO 
DELLA CONCORRENZA IN UE?
In ragione delle sue forme particolari, il mercato dei prodotti di lusso è un campo 
di interesse per i giuristi come per altri esperti, quali gli economisti ed i sociologi. Tali 
specificità giocano un ruolo centrale nella disciplina di tale mercato. Partendo dal 
diritto della concorrenza, occorre tenere in conto che l’analisi nell’ambito dell’art. 
I. KUNDA, V. BUTORAC MALNAR, Internet Distribution of Luxury Products...
Zb. Prav. fak. Sveuč. u Rij., vol. 39, br. 4 (Posebni broj), 1751-1777 (2018) 1777
101 del TFUE è parziale, se manca una riflessione sulle politiche e le regole del 
diritto della proprietà intellettuale. Con il crescere dell’importanza della vendita in 
rete nuove questioni si presentano dinanzi agli organi competenti per la concorrenza, 
come quella della legalità di alcuni tipi di limitazioni online nell’ambito del sistema 
della distribuzione selettiva. Appoggiandosi all’approccio che combina il diritto della 
proprietà intellettuale ed il diritto della concorrenza, il presente lavoro offre accesso 
e commento della prassi dell’UE con primaria attenzione per la recente decisione 
della Corte di Giustizia dell’UE nel caso Coty. La complessità dell’interazione tra le 
diverse regole ed eccezioni nel diritto della concorrenza è particolarmente evidente 
in questo caso. In ragione della limitazione della decisione alle circostanze concrete, 
la sentenza nel caso Coty può servire a chiarire la situazione rispetto alla versione de 
luxe del diritto della concorrenza soltanto con riguardo a certi divieti di vendita online 
all’interno del sistema di distribuzione selettiva; mentre, il dibattito e lo sviluppo della 
prassi nazionale continueranno rispetto alle altre limitazioni relative agli acquisti in 
rete, rimanendo in attesa di nuovi chiarimenti della Corte dell’UE.
Parole chiave: diritto dell’UE; concorrenza; proprietà intellettuale; marchio; 
prodotto di lusso; internet; distribuzione selettiva; accordi 
verticali.

